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Many applications of wireless sensor network require secure data communications, especially in a hostile environment. In order
to protect the sensitive data and the sensor readings, secret keys should be used to encrypt the exchanged messages between
communicating nodes. Traditional asymmetric key cryptosystems are infeasible in WSN due to its low capacity at each senor
node. In this paper, we propose a new key distribution scheme for hierarchical WSNs with renewable network devices. Compared
to some of the existing schemes, our key establishment methods possess the following features that are particularly beneficial to the
resource-constrained large-scale WSNs: (1) robustness to the node capture attack, (2) flexibility for adding new network devices,
(3) scalability in terms of storage cost, and (4) low communication overhead.
Copyright © 2009 An-Ni Shen et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been envisioned
to be very useful for a broad spectrum of emerging civil
and military applications [1]. However, sensor networks are
also confronted with many security threats such as node
compromise, routing disruption, and false data injection,
because they normally operate in unattended, harsh, or
hostile environment. Among all these threats, the WSNs
are particularly vulnerable to the node compromise because
sensor nodes are not tamper-proof devices. An adversary
might easily capture the sensor devices to acquire their
sensitive data and keys and then abuse them to further
compromise the communication between other noncap-
tured nodes. This typical threat is known as the node
capture attack. In order to conquer such problem, it is
desirable to design key distribution protocols to support
secure and robust pairwise communication among any pair
of sensors.
To prevent from the node capture attack is a challenging
task in sensor networks that have scarce resources in
energy, computation, and communication. Therefore, only
lightweight energy eﬃcient key distribution mechanisms
are aﬀordable. For example, the conventional asymmetric
key cryptosystem, such as RSA [2] and Diﬃe-Hellman [3],
cannot be implemented in sensor nodes due to their very
limited capacities. As the first naive solution, all sensor
devices are preloaded the same master key and thus any two
nodes can use this master key for secure communication
after deployment. However, if one sensor node is physically
captured by an adversary, it would compromise the entire
network secrecy. Another possible approach is to assign a
distinct pairwise key for each pair of sensor nodes before they
are deployed. Each sensor node needs to store (n − 1) keys,
where n is the size of the network. The solution provided
secure against the node captured attack but not scalable.
Moreover, addition of new sensors to a deployed network is
extremely diﬃcult.
WSNs can be broadly classified into flat WSNs and
hierarchical WSNs. In a flat WSN, all senor nodes have
the same computational and communication capacities. In
a hierarchical WSN, however, some special sensor devices,
called Cluster Head (CH), have much higher capacities than
other sensor nodes. By applying some clustering algorithms
like [4], the whole set of sensor devices could be partitioned
into several distinct clusters such that each cluster has at
least one CH. Under this arrangement, each sensor node
forwards the generated packets to its local CH by short-range






Figure 1: A three-tier hierarchical WSN.
transmissions, and the CH then performs a preprocessing
for the raw data received from all other senor nodes in the
cluster and finally forwards the aggregated data to the sink
node, or Base Station (BS), by long-range transmissions. Key
distribution protocols have already been studied comprehen-
sively in flat WSNs, for example, in [5–8]. Recent research
has more focused on the hierarchical architecture for large-
scale resource-constrained WSNs, because it has been shown
in [9] that a hierarchical architecture can provide better
performance, in terms of communication overhead, than a
flat architecture in such networks.
To solve the key agreement problem in hierarchical
WSNs, Jolly et al. proposed a key predistribution scheme
LEKM [10]. Before deployment, each CH stores a set of keys
in its memory and each sensor node randomly selects a key
from a CH and stores it with the CH’s Id in its memory.
After deployment, each sensor node establishes a securely
link with the CH that has been selected. This is done at each
sensor node by exchanging key information over the whole
network. Such scheme has no computational cost at both
sensor node and CH in key establishment phase and is robust
against node capture attack after the key establishment phase.
However, it has high storage and communication overhead at
CHs.
Another proposal IKDM [9] is a polynomial-based
protocol for hierarchical WSN. In the IKDM scheme, each
sensor node or CH has fixed storage cost in predistribution
phase. In order to improve the resilience against the node
captured attack, the preloaded key of each sensor node is
the exclusive-or result of  ( ≥ 1) number of bivariate
polynomial keys which can be fetched by its CH from
 number of distinctive CHs all over the network. The
parameter  defines the tradeoﬀ between the communication
overhead and the robustness to the node capture attacks at
the cluster heads. While the large  can improve the security
level of the network, it will also result in significant message
exchanges for establishing secure links.
In real applications, new network devices need to be
added into an already deployed network from time to time
in order to replace the power-exhausted or compromised
devices such that the performance of the whole network
would not significantly degrade. However, most of schemes,
for example, [9, 10], cannot provide a full solution to the key
management for adding new cluster heads and sensor nodes
in hierarchal renewable WSNs. In summary, the security
and eﬃciency requirements in a WSN may include secrecy
and authentication, robustness against node capture attack,
dynamic membership management (including new network
device addition), strong network connectivity, scalability to
large-scale networks, and low complexities on memory, com-
putation, and communication overhead. These challenges
motivate us to propose scalable and robust pairwise key
distribution mechanism between sensor devices in large-
scale WSNs. In particular, our methods possess the following
features that are particularly beneficial to the resource-
constrained WSNs: (1) robustness to the node capture attack,
(2) flexibility on key establishment for adding new network
devices, (3) scalability in terms of storage cost, and (4) low
communication overhead.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents our network model. Section 3 gives an overview of
our proposal. Section 4 describes a group of protocols for our
key distribution mechanism. Section 5 analyzes the security
and evaluates the performance of our proposal. Section 6
summarizes our findings.
2. Network Model
As in other hierarchical models of sensor network [9–11],
our system also assumes that a sensor network is divided into
clusters, which are the minimum unit for detecting events.
A cluster head coordinates all the actions inside a cluster
and each pair of cluster heads in their transmission range
can communicate directly with each other. Moreover, we
assume a single base station (BS) or an access point (AP) in
the network and works as the network controller to collect
event data. As illustrated in Figure 1(a), the BS is a fixed
infrastructure located in the network with virtually unlim-
ited computational and communication power, unlimited
memory storage capacity, and very large radio transmission
range to ensure the full coverage of the whole network area.
Another application scenario given in Figure 1(b) shows that
the information collected by cluster heads from all its sensor
nodes is retrieved by a mobile AP periodically. During the
information retrieval operation, the AP broadcasts a beacon
to activate cluster heads in its coverage area. Activated cluster
heads then transmit their data to the AP through a common
wireless channel. In the rest of paper, we use the general
term BS for such network controller for describing our key
distribution mechanism without discriminating the above
two scenarios.
Our model has three diﬀerent types of network devices:
base station, cluster head, and normal sensor node. Each
low-cost sensor node has low data processing capability,
limited memory storage and battery power supplies, and
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Table 1: Notations.
Symbol Explanation
Si The Id of the sensor node i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
CHi
The Id of cluster head in cluster
i (1 ≤ i ≤ m)
BS The Id of the base station
NS(CHa)
The set of all sensor nodes in cluster a,
that is, there is a pairwise key between
CHa and any sensor node Si ∈ NS(CHa)
λS
The average number of sensor nodes in a
cluster
NCH(CHa)
The set of all neighboring cluster heads of
cluster a, that is, there is a pairwise key
between CHa and any cluster head
CHb ∈ NCH(CHa)
λCH
The average number of neighboring
cluster heads for a cluster head
short radio transmission range. Sensor nodes are restricted
to direct communications with its CH only. The CHs are
equipped with high power batteries, large memory storages,
powerful antenna and data processing capacities, and thus
can execute relatively complicated numerical operations. As
the most powerful node in a WSN, the BS works as the
central controller for data collect and key management.
For the latter function, the BS maintains the topology of
the whole network (the Ids of network devices and their
connectivity information) and the method to generate keys
for any secure link just based on Ids. In particular, we
introduce two working modes for the BS: (1) on-line mode
and (2) oﬀ-line mode.
In an on-line working mode, the key generation method
at the BS can be requested from any cluster head and the
BS should response in a timely manner. However, such on-
line service is not always available at the BS. For example,
the BS cannot response the request in certain period of
time, in which it is already dedicated to some important
and uninterruptable tasks as illustrated in Figure 1(a), or the
requesting cluster head is not in its service area as illustrated
in Figure 1(b). Under both cases, the BS is configured to
work in the oﬀ-line mode, and the alternative methods for
key generation relying on other network devices should be
provided by the key distribution protocol.
A three-tier hierarchical wireless sensor network can
thus be modeled as a simple graph G with a finite node
set, including a base station, m cluster heads, and n sensor
nodes. A secure wireless link corresponding to the wireless
communication channel belongs to the arc set of G only if
there exists a pairwise key between the transmission nodes of
the link. In Table 1, we summarize the notations used in the
rest of the paper.
3. Overview of Our Key Distribution Scheme
In this section, we present the foundations and basic idea of
our key distribution scheme based on a three-tier hierarchal
network model.
3.1. Key Distribution in Renewable WSNs. Specifics of wire-
less sensor networks, such as strict resource constraints
and large network scalability, require a proposed security
protocol to be not only secure but also eﬃcient. Recent
research shows that preloading symmetric keys into sensors
before they are deployed is a practical method to deal with
the key distribution and management problem in wireless
sensor networking environments. After the deployment, if
two neighboring nodes have some common keys, they can
setup a secure link by the shared keys. As surveyed in
[9], the existing schemes can be classified into the follow-
ing three categories: random key predistribution schemes,
polynomial-key predistribution schemes, and location-based
key predistribution schemes.
In our key distribution scheme, a key distribution server
(KDS) is available for both of the following cases. (1) KDS
is installed in the base station, by which the keys can be
delivered instantaneously when the BS is on-line to the
requester. (2) It is available to the network deployer when the
keys are required to be preloaded into network devices.
In many applications, new network devices need to be
replenished into an already deployed network to replace
the power-exhausted or compromised devices. The corre-
sponding key management should be provided in order to
setup the secure link between a new added network device
and an existing one. To our best knowledge, there are no
full solutions to the dynamic membership management for
key distribution in hierarchal WSNs with renewable cluster
head and sensor node. For example, some of them can only
support the sensor node addition in the case when BS is on-
line. The objective of our key distribution protocols is to
provide a complete and flexible solution for such renewable
WSNs. In particular, we will provide the key distribution
protocols for both sensor node and cluster head when the
BS is on-line or oﬀ-line.
3.2. Symmetric Polynomial Function. In our key distribution
scheme, a bivariate symmetric polynomial function (s.p.f.) is
used to generate the key for each link of the network. The
t-degree bivariate symmetric polynomial function f (x, y),








i y j . (1)
The coeﬃcients ai j (0 ≤ i, j ≤ t) are randomly chosen
from a finite field GF(Q), in which Q is a prime number
that is large enough to accommodate a cryptographic key. As
implied by its name, the symmetric property of a bivariate
polynomial function satisfies f (x, y) = f (y, x). In our
key distribution scheme, the KDS maintains two bivariate
polynomial functions:
(i) the s.p.f. fCH-NS(x, y) is used to establish the key
between existing cluster head and new sensor node,
(ii) the s.p.f. fCH-NCH(x, y) is used to establish the key
between existing cluster head and new cluster head.
After the pairwise key Ka,b between network devices a
and b is generated from the above polynomial functions by






Si is added in cluster a
Si
CHa
KCHa ,Si = H( fCH-NS(Si, CHa))
Erase fCH-NS(Si, y)
Si, CHa
KCHa ,Si = H( fCH-NS(CHa, Si))
Data = E(KCHa ,Si ,KBS,CHa )
Si, data
KCHa ,Si = E(data,KBS,CHa )
Figure 2: Protocol illustration of adding a new sensor node when BS is on-line.
substituting the variables with Ids of the two communicating
parties, the data over the link can therefore be securely trans-
mitted as E(data, Ka,b), which is a symmetric encryption
function using Ka,b as the key.
By applying the symmetric property, a secure link can
be easily built up by just exchanging the Ids of transmission
nodes. However, such scheme suﬀers the t-security problem,
which means a t-degree bivariate polynomial key scheme can
only keep secure against coalitions of up to t compromised
sensors. When the number of compromised nodes is less
than t, the coeﬃcients of the polynomial cannot be derived
even all the compromised nodes put their stored information
together. But once more than t nodes are compromised,
the adversary can crack the coeﬃcients of the polynomial
such that all the pairwise keys in the entire group would be
cracked. Although increasing the value of t can improve the
security property of bivariate polynomial key scheme, it is
not suitable for wireless sensor networks due to the limited
memory size of sensors. In order to conquer this limitation,
the pairwise key x calculated from the polynomials will be
further scrambled by a one-to-one hash function H(x).
4. Key Distribution Protocols
Our scheme supports new network device (sensor node
and cluster head) addition for both BS on-line and oﬀ-line
scenarios with the minimum assumption that the deployed
network has completed its key establishment, that is, the
key Ka,b for any secure link (a, b) is already shared by both
network devices a and b. Furthermore, our proposed scheme
can provide forward secrecy as well as full prevention from
the node capture attack for large-scale sensor networks.
4.1. BS is On-Line. Let Si be the new sensor node to be added
in the network. In order to calculate the key between Si and
its cluster head, the calculation can be done at the BS if it is
working at the on-line mode. Suppose new sensor node Si
is randomly added into the network and eventually belongs
to cluster CHa. The following Protocol 1, as illustrated in
Figure 2, is to establish a secure link between Si and CHa.
Protocol 1 (sensor addition when BS is on-line).
(1) The new sensor node Si is randomly deployed to
the existing network with preloaded information: the
s.p.f. fCH-NS(Si, y) and a key KBS,Si .
(2) After Si is deployed, it exchanges Ids with its cluster
head CHa.
(3) Si evaluates its stored s.p.f. fCH-NS(Si, y) at y =
CHa to establish the key between itself and its
cluster head as KCHa ,Si = H( fCH-NS(Si, CHa)). After
calculating the pairwise key, Si erases the preloaded
s.p.f. fCH-NS(Si, y) immediately to avoid potential
attacks.
(4) CHa requests the new key between CHa and Si from
BS by forwarding the Id of Si and its own Id.
(5) BS then calculates the corresponding key using
the s.p.f. fCH-NS as and returns the encrypted key
E(KCHa,Si ,KBS,CHa) back to CHa.
(6) CHa decrypts the received date to recover KCHa,Si
using the key KBS,CHa , which was already loaded
at CHa since its very initial deployment, that is,
KCHa,Si = E(E(KCHa,Si ,KBS,CHa),KBS,CHa).
Now we consider the addition of a new cluster head and
the corresponding key distribution procedures when the BS
is on-line. We assume the CHa is to be replaced by a new
cluster head CHa′ , due to its low power level. Note that in the
replacement phase of cluster head, the communication keys
with existing network devices (i.e., cluster head and sensor
node) are also renewed, not simply making use of the copies
of the previous keys. This process avoids potential attack
activities and achieves the forward secrecy. In other words,
even the attacker could intercept packets and analysis data
to compromise the key of old cluster head, it still cannot
decrypt the secret data using the old keys.
The following Protocol 2, as illustrated in Figure 3, is to
build up the keys between the new cluster head CHa′ , and all
existing sensor nodes Si (Si ∈ NS(CHa)) in the same cluster
as well as the keys between the new cluster head CHa′ , and all
its neighboring cluster heads CHb (CHb ∈ NCH(CHa)).








Deploy CHa′ to the cluster
where CHa is located
CHb(CHb ∈ NCH(CHa)) Si(Si ∈ NS(CHa)) BS
Data = E(KCHa′ ,CHb ,KBS,CHb ), CHa′
KCHa′ ,CHb = E(data,KBS,CHb )
Data = E(KCHa′ ,Si ,KBS,Si ), CHa′
KCHa′ ,Si = E(data,KBS,Si )
Figure 3: Protocol illustration of adding a new cluster head when BS is on-line.
Protocol 2 (CH addition when BS is on-line).
(1) The following secret information is created and
preloaded into CHa′ :
(i) the pairwise key with base station KBS,CHa′ ,
(ii) for each sensor node Si ∈ NS(CHa), its Id and
the key KCHa′ ,Si = H( fCH-NS(CHa′ , Si)),
(iii) for each cluster heads CHb ∈ NCH(CHa), its Id
and key KCHa′ ,CHb = H( fCH-NCH(CHa′ , CHb)),
(2) The new cluster head CHa′ is then deployed physi-
cally to the cluster area where the old cluster CHa is
located.
(3) The base station transmits the encrypted key
E(KCHa′ ,CHb ,KBS,CHb) to each neighboring cluster
head CHb of CHa such that it can be decrypted as
KCHa′ ,CHb at the side of CHb using the key KBS,CHb ,
that is, KCHa′ ,CHb = E(E(KCHa′ ,CHb ,KBS,CHb),KBS,CHb).
(4) Similarly, BS transmits the encrypted key
E(KCHa′ ,Si ,KBS,Si) to each senor node Si of CHa
such that it can be decrypted as KCHa′ ,Si at the side
of Si, that is, KCHa′ ,Si = E(E(KCHa′ ,Si ,KBS,Si),KBS,Si),
using the key KBS,Si .
4.2. BS is Oﬀ-Line
Protocol 3 (sensor addition when BS is oﬀ-line).
(1) The new sensor node Si is randomly deployed to
the existing network with the following preloaded
information:
(i) the pairwise key KBS,Si shared with BS,
(ii) the Id of a cluster head CHb, which is an
arbitrary CH already in the network,
(iii) the key KCHb ,Si = H( fCH-NS(Si, CHb)) shared
with CHb,
(iv) the encrypted key E(KCHb ,Si ,KBS,CHb) of KCHb ,Si
using KBS,CHb ,
(2) The added sensor node Si sends the join-request
message to the cluster head CHa with the preloaded
secret information CHb and E(KCHb ,Si ,KBS,CHb) and
erases E(KCHb ,Si ,KBS,CHb) afterwards.
(3) Based on CHb, CHa then knows to request the
secret key from CHb by providing information
E(KCHb ,Si ,KBS,CHb) and Id of Si.
(4) After receiving the request message, CHb uses KBS,CHb
to decrypt E(KCHb ,Si ,KBS,CHb) and obtain the pair-
wise key KCHb ,Si . CHb then re-encrypts it using
KCHa,CHb as the key and sends E(KCHb ,Si ,KCHa,CHb)
back to CHa. Finally, CHb deletes E(KCHb ,Si ,KBS,CHb),
E(KCHb ,Si ,KCHa ,CHb), and KCHb ,Si immediately.
(5) CHa decrypts E(KCHb ,Si ,KCHa ,CHb) by KCHa,CHb to
obtain the key KCHb ,Si with Si.
Similar to the on-line case, we assume that the new
sensor node Si is randomly added into the network and
eventually belongs to cluster CHa. In order to create the key
between Si and CHa, a cluster head CHb is randomly assigned
as the proxy of BS as illustrated in Figure 3. All required
information to generate the key should be first forwarded to
CHb. The detailed process is described in Protocol 3.
We notice that the cluster head CHb may be physically
located far from CHa due to the random deployment
process of the sensor nodes, resulting in a relatively high
communication overhead between CHa due CHb. In order to
reduce such overhead, up to  number of CHs are randomly
chosen as potential proxies of BS and the corresponding
keys are all generated and stored in Si. CHa will choose the
closest one, for example, with minimum hops, as the selected
proxy by looking up its routing table based on their Ids.
Comparing to the on-line case, we also observe that the BS-
on-line case is more eﬃcient than the BS-oﬀ-line case in
terms of communication and memory overhead when both
are possible.
Finally, we consider the addition of a new cluster head
when the BS is oﬀ-line. The same set of symbols as in the
on-line case is used and the corresponding Protocol 4 is
illustrated in Figure 5.






Si is added in cluster a
Si
CHa
CHb ,E(KCHb ,Si ,KBS,CHb )
Erase E(KCHb ,Si ,KBS,CHb )
Si, CHa,E(KCHb ,Si ,KBS,CHb )
Data = E(KCHb ,Si ,KBS,CHb )
KCHb ,Si = E(data,KBS,CHb )
Data = E(KCHb ,Si ,KCHa ,CHb )
Data, Si
KCHa ,Si = E(data,KCHa ,CHb )
KCHb ,Si
E(KCHb ,Si ,KBS,CHb )
E(KCHb ,Si ,KCHa ,CHb )
CHb(a proxy of BS)CHa
Erase
Figure 4: Protocol illustration of adding a new sensor node when BS is oﬀ-line.
Protocol 4 (CH addition when BS is oﬀ-line).
(1) The following secret information is created and
preloaded into CHa′ :
(i) the pairwise key with base station KBS,CHa′ ,
(ii) for each sensor Si ∈ NS(CHa), its Id, the key
KCHa′ ,Si = H( fCH-NS(CHa′ , Si)) and encrypted
key E(KCHa′ ,Si ,KBS,Si),
(iii) for each cluster head CHb ∈ NCH(CHa), its Id,
the key KCHa′ ,CHb = H( fCH-NCH(CHa′ , CHb))
and the encrypted key E(KCHa′ ,CHb ,KBS,CHb),
(2) The new cluster head CHa′ is then deployed physi-
cally to the cluster area where the old cluster CHa is
located.
(3) CHa′ exchanges Ids with each sensor node Si ∈
NS(CHa) and then sends Si the corresponding
encrypted key E(KCHa′ ,Si ,KBS,Si). After that the new
cluster head CHa′ erases E(KCHa′ ,Si ,KBS,Si) immedi-
ately. Each sensor node Si then decrypts the received
information to recover the key KCHa′ ,Si .
(4) CHa′ exchanges Ids with each neighboring cluster
head CHb ∈ NCH(CHa) and then sends CHb the
corresponding encrypted key E(KCHa′ ,CHb ,KBS,CHb).
After that the new cluster head CHa′ erases
E(KCHa′ ,CHb ,KBS,CHb) immediately. Each cluster head
CHb decrypts the received information to recover the
key KCHa′ ,CHb .
5. Security and Performance Evaluation
In this section, we will analyze the security and evaluate the
performance of our proposed scheme by comparing with
IKDM [9] and LEKM [10].
We note that neither of IKDM and LEKM protocols
supports cluster head addition process. Regarding the sensor
node addition process, we have the following observations.
Recall that in the IKDM scheme, the polynomial functions
to be used for key generation are stored in CHs all the
time and thus no on-line BS is required. As we shall later,
while it simplifies the process by avoiding the involvement
of BS, potential security problem has been neglected. In
the LEKM scheme, the preloaded key at each sensor node
must be stored in some cluster head as well. If the key
assigned to the new sensor node has not been preloaded to
some CH at very initial deployment of the network, such
key must be distributed to a CH as well by the on-line
BS. Therefore, in the following evaluation, we only consider
the oﬀ-line BS case and on-line BS case for the IKDM and
LEKM protocols, respectively, in the senor node addition
process.
5.1. Security Analysis. The security is analyzed in terms of the
ability to defend from the node capture attack, which means
the capture of some nodes may compromise the communica-
tion between other noncaptured nodes. This is recognized as
the major threat in wireless sensor networks. In particular,
we consider the security property of all these schemes in
two typical scenarios: the fractions of compromised keys in
noncaptured sensor nodes as a function of the number of
compromised cluster heads and the number of sensor node,
respectively.
Because only pairwise keys are remained in the sensor
nodes for all schemes after deployment the network, that is,
all security parameters that will not be used in the future
have been already erased from the network, any sensor node’s
compromising will not endanger the secret communications
of other noncaptured nodes. In other words, all these
schemes have full ability to defense the node capture attack
at sensor nodes.
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CHa′ Si(Si ∈ NS(CHa)) CHb(CHb ∈ NCH(CHa))
Preload
Si, CHb
KBS,CHa′ ,KCHa′ ,Si ,KCHa′ ,CHb
E(KCHa′ ,Si ,KBS,Si )
E(KCHa′ ,CHb ,KBS,CHb )
Deploy CHa′ to the cluster
where CHa is located
CHa′
Si
Data = E(KCHa′ ,Si ,KBS,Si )
Erase E(KCHa′ ,Si ,KBS,Si ) KCHa′ ,Si = E(data,KBS,Si )
CHa′
CHb
Data = E(KCHa′ ,CHb ,KBS,CHb )
Erase E(KCHa′ ,CHb ,KBS,CHb ) KCHa′ ,CHb = E(data,KBS,CHb )
Figure 5: Protocol illustration of adding a new cluster head when BS is oﬀ-line.
Table 2: Storage cost comparison over various distribution schemes.
Schemes Our protocols IKDM LEKM
On-line
Cluster head
λS + λCH Ids λS + m keys
λS + λCH + 1 keys
Sensor node
One key N/A One Id
One s.p.f. Two keys
Oﬀ-line
Cluster head
λS + λCH Ids One key
N/A
2λS + 2λCH + 1 keys Two s.p.f.
Sensor node
 Ids  Ids
2 + 1 keys Two keys
Now we consider the security property when some cluster
heads are compromised. In our key distribution protocols,
because the pairwise keys in CHs are unique and hashed,
they cannot be used to obtain the corresponding polynomial,
that is, all the coeﬃcients of the polynomial, reversely. We
conclude that our scheme has full ability to defense the node
capture attack. This conclusion applies to LEKM as well
because all unrelated keys are removed at CHs after network
deployment. On the other hand, the IKDM scheme has the t-
security problem because all preloaded t-degree polynomials
at each CH will not be removed after network deployment.
Once a group of CHs, exceeding t, are captured, all the keys
in noncaptured nodes will also be compromised.
5.2. Performance Evaluation. Now we turn our attention to
evaluate the performance of this group of key distribution
schemes in hierarchical WSNs. The performance metrics are
storage and communication overhead.
To supports a large-scale WSN, a feasible solution of key
distribution should be scalable in terms of storage cost. In the
scheme LEKM [10], the number of keys stored in each CH is
linearly proportional to the number of clusters. The IKDM
scheme has fixed storage overhead for sensor nodes and
cluster heads. Our scheme has fixed storage cost for sensor
nodes. The storage requirement O(λS + λCH) for cluster head
is also reasonable because it requires to communicate with at
least λS+λCH number of nodes. The performance comparison
in various network sizes is summarized in Table 2.
As shown in Figures 3 and 5 for the cluster head addition
processes, the communication overhead of Protocols 2 and 4
is both fixed under the condition that λS and λCH are constant
numbers, which is true for a uniform node deployment.
This feature shows the scalability of our scheme in terms of
message complexity. They are also the first solution for key
management in WSNs with renewable cluster heads.
In the following, we conduct a simulation study on
the communication overhead for the sensor node addition
process. We have implemented a simulation tool using Java
for the special purpose of evaluating the performance of this
group of protocols while the lower MAC layer is assumed to
be ideal.
A hierarchical wireless sensor network was simulated
with diﬀerent sizes of n sensor nodes and m clusters. In
order to study the scalability of these protocols, we have
considered the scenarios with a specified a cluster size m
(m = 9, 16, 25, 36, 49, 64, 81, and 100) and a sensor node
size n (n = 100 m). For each example, the whole network
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Figure 6: Communication overhead comparison.
is regularly organized as
√
m × √m number of clusters, and
there are exactly 100 sensor nodes in each R× R cluster. The
transmission range of each cluster head is set as
√
5R, and the
communications between CHs may be made in a multihop
manner if they are separated far away from each other. To
simulate the sensor node addition process, we consider 10
new sensor nodes to be added to each cluster. In each message
interaction for all protocols, the length of each Id and key
takes up 32 and 80 bits, respectively.
The performance comparison is made in terms of
communication overhead. It is evaluated in the number of
bits transmitted for key establishment between a sensor node
and a cluster head. In all cases, that is, a sensor node size
n, a cluster size m, and a specific key distribution scheme,
we randomly generated 50 diﬀerent instances and we present
here the average over those 50 instances.
As shown in Figure 6(a), our scheme has the fixed and
lowest communication overhead for the on-line scenario.
The experimental results also comply with our protocol
design for the oﬀ-line scenario, in which multiple candidate
proxies can improve the performance, that is, the commu-
nication overhead is a decreasing function of  under fixed
network size. In summary, our scheme in both scenarios
can significantly outperform other proposals as shown in
Figure 6(b).
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we present an eﬃcient and flexible key distri-
bution scheme based on three-tier renewable wireless sensor
networks. Our scheme can defend against node capture
attack and support dynamic membership management. To
our best knowledge, the solution of the key establishment
for new cluster heads under both the BS oﬀ-line and on-
line cases is proposed by the first time. Furthermore, our
scheme is eﬃcient and scalable in terms of communication
and storage costs, which is particularly beneficial to support
large-scale and resource constrained WSNs.
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